In an ID-based universal designated verifier signature scheme, a single signer generates a signature that can only be verified by a designated verifier using a simplified public identity such as an e-mail address. In this paper, we expand the scheme to a multi-user setting for generating and verifying signatures in practical applications. An ID-based multisigner universal designated multi-verifier signature scheme based on bilinear pairings is proposed that allows a set of multi-signer to cooperatively generate a signature and designate a set of multi-verifier to verify it. The security of the proposed scheme is demonstrated to be resistant to existentially forgery from adaptive chosen-message and chosen-ID attacks under the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem.
Introduction
Paperwork is rapidly being replaced as e-mail, electronic commerce, and electronic monetary transactions become more widespread. For many of these new forms of communication, a digital signature is essential. In traditional signature schemes such as RSA [1] and DSA [2] , anyone can verify the validity of a signature by using the signer's public key, and the signer cannot successfully claim he/she did not sign a message. In numerous applications such as tenders, electronic voting, or electronic auctions, the public verification and non-repudiation properties of a signature are not desired. For an example, in electronic voting schemes, a voting center seeks to verify that a vote has been properly counted in the final tally by means of the center's signature on the receipt. Voters must not have the ability to use such receipts to verify the nature of their votes. Otherwise, it results that the briber believe that the voter indeed votes some candidate according to his/her direction and then give the obedient voter some gain.
To satisfy the above requirements in electronic voting schemes, the designated verifier signature (DVS) concept was introduced by Jakobsson, Sako, and Impagliazzo [3] . The signature of a message in the DVS scheme is intended to be a special verifier chosen by the signer, and only the designated verifier is able to verify its validity. This can be viewed as a "light signature scheme" [4] . No one else than the designated verifier can be convinced of the authenticity of this signature since the designated verifier himself can simulate the signature which is indistinguishable from the one generated by the signer. That is, no one can affirm the identity of the signer or the designated verifier who issued the signature. Jakobsson et al. also introduced a stronger vision of the DVS scheme called strong designated verifier signature (SDVS). In a SDVS scheme, the designated verifier's private key is involved in the verification phase so that no one else other than the designated verifier can verify the validity of signature. Later, Saeednia et al. [5] formalized SDVS notation and proposed an efficient scheme.
Steinfeld et al. [6] in Asiacrypt 2003 defined and proposed a new type of DVS scheme called an universal designated verifier signature (UDVS). It has the same properties as DVS schemes and it also can function as a standard publicly verifiable signature scheme that additionally allows any signature holder (not necessarily the signer) to designate the signature to any desired designated verifier (using the verifier's public key). The security of their scheme is based on the Bilinear DiffieHellman (BDH) problem. Simultaneously, they demonstrated how to extend the classical Schnorr or RSA signature schemes to UDVS schemes [7] . Like SDVS schemes, the designated verifier's private key in the UDVS schemes is also involved in the verification phase. This is because the verifier's public key is used in the designated signature generation phase. However, the SDVS scheme is specially designed for designated verifier signatures, and does not provide an additional function to convert a publicly verifiable signature scheme into a designated verifier signature.
Some fair distributed contract signing and verifying schemes have been designed for use in a multi-user setting. For multi-verifier settings, Laguillaumie and Vergnaud [8, 9] extended DVS notation and developed designated multi-verifier signature (DV M S). It differs from DVS in that the designated signature is intended to correspond to a specific set of different verifiers. On the other hand, Ng et al. [10] extended UDVS notation as universal designated multi-verifier signature (UDV M S) to allow a signature holder to designate the signature to multi-verifier. They proposed two UDV M S schemes based on Steinfeld et al.'s UDVS scheme. Shailaja et al. [11] and Yang et al. [12] proposed a UDV M S scheme based on the q-Strong DiffieHellman assumption and Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption, respectively. The security of their schemes is proven in the standard model. For multi-signer settings, Zhang et al. [13] proposed a multi-signer strong designated signature (S M SDVS)
based on the BDH assumption. The designated signature should be collectively generated by multi-signer and with no one able to verify its validity except the designated verifier. We refer to references [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] as providing examples of related work and applications for multi-user settings. Most related designated verifier signature schemes are based on a certificate-based PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) [8-10, 5,7,11,6,12,13] . In certificate-based designated verifier signature schemes, a user must obtain a certificate of a long-lived public key from the CA (Certification Authority) and verify its correctness before utilizing the user's public key. Such certificate-based designated verifier signature schemes lead to the problems of certificate management and the high computational cost of certificate verification. In ID-based systems [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] , a user's public key is derived from the identity such as email addresses, IP address and there is a trusted party KGC (Key Generation Center) that generates the corresponding private key of the user. Advantageous aspects of an ID-based system include not requiring the public key directories and simplified key revocation. Therefore, some ID-based designated verifier signature schemes have been proposed, such as IDbased universal designated verifier signature (ID-UDVS) [19] , ID-based strong designated verifier signature (ID-SDVS) [20] [21] [22] , and ID-based universal designated multi-verifier signature (ID-UDV M S) [23] .
A designated signature scheme has not yet been developed for both multi-signer settings and multi-verifier settings. We expand the example presented in [13] to conform to these factors. A group of witnesses want to collectively report an offence to a prosecutor. To avoid retaliation, a multi-signer designated verifier signature can be used on the on the report allowing only a designated prosecutor to verify the signature. However, to avoid a briber to canvass a corrupt prosecutor is necessary. This can be accomplished by distributing the power of verifying a signature in a multi-verifier setting. That is, a multi-witness designated verifier signature on the report can only be verified by multi-prosecutors. A multi-user setting in the designated signature scheme would be best implemented by ID-based systems since more users' public keys are involved and used. Moreover, if the scheme has the property "universal," it will be more convenient than strong designated verifier signature schemes.
In this paper, an ID-based multi-signer universal designated multi-verifier signature (ID-S M UDV M S) scheme is proposed, which generalizes an ID-UDVS scheme. In the ID-S M UDV M S scheme, all users' public keys are derived from their identities simplifying the key management procedures. A publicly verifiable signature is cooperatively generated by multi-signer and any holder of the signature can designate it to any desired multi-verifier by using the verifiers' public keys. Given the designated signature, the designated multi-verifier can cooperatively verify that the message is signed by the multi-signer but cannot prove the same fact to a third party. Note that Lipmma et al. [24] identified a new security property for designated verifier signatures: the non-delegatability. This means that neither the signer or nor the designated verifier should able to produce a "meta-key" which allows to generate a new signature without revealing their secret keys. However, the delegatability is inherent to all related UDVS [25] . Since the proposed ID-S M UDV M S is universal and belongs to UDVS, our scheme is delegatable. Regardless the numbers of signers and verifiers are, the generated signature length of the proposed ID-S M UDV M S scheme is independent of the number of signers and verifiers. The proposed ID-S M UDV M S scheme is secure against existential forgery under the chosen-message attacks and chosen-ID attacks in the random oracle model assuming the BDH problem is hard. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Some basic concepts on bilinear pairing are introduced in Section 2. In Section 3, an ID-S M UDV M S scheme is presented. Section 4 analyzes the security of the proposed ID-S M UDV M S scheme.
The performance of the proposed scheme is presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries

Admissible bilinear pairings
Let G 1 be a cyclic additive group and G 2 be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q for some large prime q. An admissible bilinear pairing is a map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 , which satisfies the following properties:
q . This can also be
• Non-degenerate: There exist P , Q ∈ G 1 such that e(P , Q ) = 1.
• Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P , Q ) for all P , Q ∈ G 1 .
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption
The security of our scheme relies on the hardness of the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem.
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman parameter generator G. A randomized algorithm G is a bilinear Diffie-Hellman parameter generator if (1) G takes a security parameter κ ∈ Z + , (2) G runs in polynomial time in κ, and (3) G outputs a κ-bit prime number q, the description of groups G 1 , G 2 of order q, and the description of an admissible bilinear map e :
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem. Let G be a bilinear Diffie-Hellman parameter generator to generate q, G 1 , G 2 , e . An algorithm A has advantage (κ) in solving the BDH problem for G and a random generator P of G 1 if for sufficiently large κ:
where the probability is over the random choice of a, b, c ∈ Z * q , P ∈ G 1 , and the random bits of A. We say that G satisfies the BDH assumption if there is no randomized algorithm A that can solve the BDH problem with a non-negligible advantage (κ). Setup: KGC runs BDH parameter generator G to generate a prime q, two groups G 1 and G 2 of order q, and an admissible bilinear map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 . KGC chooses a random generator P ∈ G 1 , a random s ∈ Z * q , and set P pub = sP . Then, KGC keeps s as the master secret key and publishes system parameters params = q, G 1 , G 2 , e, P , P pub , H 1 , H 2 , where H 1 : {0, 1} * → G 1 and H 2 : {0, 1} * → Z * q are cryptographic hash functions.
Extract: Given an identity ID, KGC computes the public key Q ID = H 1 (ID) and the private key S ID = sQ ID , and returns S ID to the user with identity ID.
ID-S:
Let S = {ID Si , i = 1, . . . ,n} be a set of signers' identities, each signer performs the following steps to generate his individual signature on a message m:
(1) Choose a random r i ∈ Z * q to compute (1) and then broadcast U i to other co-signers.
The ID-based individual signature (ID-S signature) on the message m is σ i = (U i , V i , U ).
ID-SPV: Given the system parameters params, a message m, a ID-S signature
If it holds, then the ID-S signature is valid and output accepted; otherwise, output is rejected.
ID-S
M : Combine n co-singers' ID-S signatures σ i s on the message m:
The ID-based multi-signer signature (ID-S M signature) on the message m is σ = (U , V ).
M PV: Given the system parameter params, a message m, a ID-S
If it holds, then output accepted; otherwise, output rejected.
ID-UDV
M : Let V = {ID V j , j = 1, . . . ,l} be a set of verifiers' identities. Given a set V and a message-signature pair (m, σ ),
The universal designated multi-verifier signature (ID-UDV
M functions the publicly verifiable multi-signer signature σ = (U , V ) to allow any holder of the signature can designate it to any multi-verifier.
M V: Given a set S of signers' public keys, a set V of verifiers's private keys, and a message-signature pair (m, σ D V ),
If it holds, then output accept; otherwise, output reject. It can be seen that the lengths of the generated signatures in algorithms ID-S M and ID-UDV M are independent of the number of signers and verifiers. Next, we show the completeness of the ID-S M UDV M S scheme with regard to algorithms Proof.
by Eq. (2).
the message m can be verified using Eq. (9).
Proof.
by bilinear property
by Eqs. (4), (6) 
by Eq. (1) and Eq. (2). 
Security analysis
The ID-S signatures are secure has been proved by Lin et al. [26] , which is equivalent to the signature in Cha-Cheon scheme [27] under the assumption of a one-way hash function H 1 . For the message m, combining n ID-S signatures
, is the same as the Cha-Cheon signature if the public key Q ID is treated as:
. Their scheme has been proved secure against existential forgery under the chosen-message attacks and chosen-ID attacks in the random oracle model assuming the BDH problem is hard in groups generated by G. Due to limitations of space, in this paper we omit the detailed descriptions of those proofs here. We directly prove the unforgeability and non-transferability of ID-S M UDV M S as follows. 
Proof. Algorithm B is given as inputting the BDH parameters q, G 1 , G 2 , e generated by G and a random instance P , aP , b P , c P of the BDH problem for these parameters. B is to inject the above P , aP , b P , c P during the simulation, and to compute e(P , P ) abc .
• 
If algorithm B does not abort during the simulation then algorithm A's view is identical to its view in the real attack. | q| + |G 2 |
Conclusions
In this paper, we presented an ID-based multi-signer universal designated multi-verifier signature scheme that generalizes the basic ID-based universal designated verifier signature schemes for more applications. We employ the ID-based cryptography to simplify the key management procedures. Through the multi-user setting is in the scheme, the signature length is independent of the number of signers and verifiers. Concerning the BDH problem, this study has demonstrated that the proposed scheme is provably secure against existential forgery under the chosen-message attacks and chosen-ID attacks in the random oracle model.
